By Reinhard Tietz (auth.), Prof. Dr. Reinhard Tietz, Prof. Dr. Wulf Albers, Prof. Dr. Reinhard Selten (eds.)
The booklet experiences on fresh experimental examine on expectancies and choice making in bargaining, markets, auctions, or coalition formation events. The investi- gated issues bring construction stones for a bounded rational idea as an method of clarify habit and interpersonal interactions in monetary and social relationships.
Read Online or Download Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets: Proceedings of the Fourth Conference on Experimental Economics, Bielefeld, West Germany, September 21–25, 1986 PDF
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Additional info for Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets: Proceedings of the Fourth Conference on Experimental Economics, Bielefeld, West Germany, September 21–25, 1986
We decided that the simplest course of ac- tion was to forbid overdrafts and to try to estimate the risk-aversion of the subjects. The ban on borrowing in itself was sufficient to change the optimal strategy: even with all the other features of the model intact the optimal strategy is no longer (13). To determine it we had to resort to numerical computation. Of course, if sub- jects are not risk-neutral then the optimal strategy depends on their attitude to risk; that is why we tried to measure their risk aversion.
When we use i t + T , T=-20, .. ,-1 to estimate the coefficients we get a better description of the predictions for subjects 1,4 and 6. The estimation of coefficients from more periods delivers worse results. e. if we use i t + T , T=-10, ... ,-1, +1, ... ,+10 to estimate the coefficients of the regression model we get significantly better descriptions of behaviour for subjects 1 and 4. One has to keep in mind, however, that this is only a description of learning but not an explanation. BECKER (1967) also proposed a rule for the formation of the median values of all subjects' predictions.
407-416. l. (1966): Egotism and altruism in social dilemmata, in: A. ): Attitude and Behavioral Decisions (in press), New York. F. (1964): National security and the nuclear testban, Scientific American, 211, pp. 27-35. , Jr. (1969): Prediction of behavior in two-person games, Journal of Personality and Social Pychology, 13, pp. 222-238. , Jr. (1971): Effects of outcome matrix and partner's behavior in two-person games, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 7, pp. 190-2l0. Social Dilemmata 29 Appendix The individual strategies and fallacies used by the subjects in social dilemma game situations as mentioned the main part of the paper, (three dimensional) tables.
Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets: Proceedings of the Fourth Conference on Experimental Economics, Bielefeld, West Germany, September 21–25, 1986 by Reinhard Tietz (auth.), Prof. Dr. Reinhard Tietz, Prof. Dr. Wulf Albers, Prof. Dr. Reinhard Selten (eds.)